COL. HELVEY: WEAPONIZING NOVIOLENCE

Adam Larson
Caustic Logic/Guerillas Without Guns
April 11 2007

The president of the Albert Einstein Institution as of 2006 is retired US Army Colonel Robert Helvey, a longtime proponent of Sharp’s theories. More than anyone else it has been Helvey who has weaponized his mentor’s ideas of nonviolent conflict and put it to use in the field. He holds a BA and MA from Marshall University, is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, and US Navy War College. [1] He has 30 years of experience in Southeast Asia, including two tours of duty in Vietnam (awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, January 1968). [2] Helvey has also worked with the U.S. Defense Intelligence College, which is in turn connected to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in which he was reportedly an officer. [3] Exact details of his life and career remain somewhat vague, but among other posts he held, from 1983 until 1985 Helvey was a US military attaché at the American Embassy in Rangoon, the capital of Burma. The Colonel later described how he became dismayed by the utter futility of the two-decade-old US-backed armed struggle against the military dictatorship there. [4]

Col. Robert Helvey, leading strategist of nonviolent struggle.

He spent his last years of military service mulling over this dilemma, the final year in an academic setting. Curiously, he wound up with a senior fellowship at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, where he happened to hear about a lecture on nonviolent sanctions to be given by the department’s esteemed professor Gene Sharp. Helvey later recalled how Sharp “started out the seminar by saying 'Strategic nonviolent struggle is all about political power,” spurring Helvey to muse “Boy is this guy speaking my language, that is what armed struggle is about.” [5] An article from Peace magazine, April 2003 explained:

“From conversations with Sharp and like-minded colleagues at the Albert Einstein Institution, Helvey learned a systematic strategy of resistance. For example, he learned to avoid exposed situations that could lead to heavy casualties such as the protest in 1988 when 3,000 unarmed students were massacred in Rangoon. He came to see that even greater pressure could be applied to the regime with less risky tactics, such as having people simply stay at home during a general strike.” [6]

After officially retiring from the Army in 1991, Helvey took Sharp’s ideas to a wider audience of influential people. He soon secured funding to go back to Burma to spread his message and, if possible, test the technique. From 1992-98 Helvey made over a dozen trips to the Thai-Burmese border to meet with leaders of pro-democracy groups there. He developed and taught a six-week course, with students cycling through in shifts to work on confidence building, identifying the regime's weaknesses, and forming “usable pressure groups.” When confronted by Burmese leaders who scoffed at non-violence against the thugs in charge, Helvey started using the more militant-sounding phrase “political defiance,” which, he stressed, “like military struggle, is both an art and a science. To be effective, it must be studied and carried out with skill and discipline.” [7]

The training Helvey brought to Burma is still used, in line as it is with the non-violent tactics stressed by “the Lady,” Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Modern Burma’s founding father. Helvey describes Suu Kyi, under house arrest for years, as “the symbol of the entire pro-democracy movement. Without her, the movement has not demonstrated the ability to take on strategic struggle.” It was reportedly at Suu Kyi’s urging that Sharp's book FDTD was translated, published, and smuggled into Burma. [8] So far the repressive regime is still in power, but Suu Kyi maintains a strong following and has gradually been given more freedom, and thankfully there have been no more massacres like the one in 1988. But direct success or not, Helvey adopted and championed Sharp’s approach to winning conflicts, retired and became a man of peace heading the AEI as it embarked on its many adventures. Over the following years and the course of this book, Helvey would fulfill an important niche in the real-world implementation of Sharp’s ideas in over a half-dozen countries. Some of his handiwork will play a role in the following chapters.

Next: The American End: Overt Ops/A Bi-Partisan Effort

Sources:
[1] About AEI > Staff & Board > Bob Helvey, President. Accessed at: http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations.php3?action=printContentItem&orgid=88&typeID=7&itemID=48&User_Session=346723d93fdd7b3f54352c8c92b94d2f
[2] First Cavalry Division Distiguished Service cross Recipients. Acc. June 12 2006 at: http://www.1stcavmedic.com/DSC-CAV.htm
[3] Mowat, Jonathan. “Coup d'État in Disguise: Washington's New World Order "Democratization" Template.”
GlobalResearch.ca February 9, 2005. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=MOW20050209&articleId=437
[4], [6], [7] Bacher, John. "Robert Helvey's Expert Political Defiance." Peace Magazine Apr-Jun 2003, p.10. http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v19n2p10.htm
[5] Mowat, Jonathan. "The new Gladio in action? Ukrainian postmodern coup completes testing of new template." Online Journal. March 19 2005. http://www.onlinejournal.org/Special_Reports/031905Mowat-1/031905mowat-1.html
[8] Rozen, Laura. "Dictator downturn: It just isn't as easy being a tyrant as it used to be." Salon. February 3 2001.
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/02/03/dictators/print.html

THE LIMITS OF AIR POWER/THE PARIAH’S CLUB

The Stage is Set for the Bulldozer Revolution
Adam Larson / Guerillas Without Guns
Posted 3/13/07

As pressure grew over the situation in Kosovo, Yeltsin’s Russia pursued diplomacy, trying to make a name in the international community as a peace-maker while protecting the interests of its client state. The US played along with the Rambouillet conference of early 1999, though Milosevic was accused of leveraging such periods of calm to push his campaign deeper into Kosovo. With talks thus deemed counterproductive, Washington led the formation of an offensive coalition to solve the crisis. President Bush, confronted with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, had used the UN Security Council, the mark of the New World Order. But this time the plan was different. In 1995, Clinton pursued NATO as the venue of action instead, circumventing Russian and Chinese involvement in the decisions. [1] When the peace process broke down over Kosovo, it was again decided to pursue the Euro-Atlantic route and NATO again decided on war.

NATO, it seemed, had found its new mission and reaffirmed it on March 24, a bare twelve days after announcing its expanded power with the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czezh Republic. The campaign opened with bombs on Serb forces in Kosovo, eventually moving to Serbia itself. Operation Allied Force was waged entirely from the air, though there were threats of ground invasion late in the campaign. Civilian installations such as power plants, petrochemical plants, water processing plants and the state-owned broadcaster were intentionally targeted, and the Chinese Embassy was also hit, allegedly a simple accident.

CNN reported May 18 that “NATO launched its 55th day of air strikes against Yugoslavia on Monday,” with a “decided downturn […] from around 600 sorties daily to just 343. NATO said bad weather forced the cancellation of most flights.” [2] Such a massive bombardment was sure to kill civilians, as was made clear by well-publicized events like the apparently purposeful attack directly on an Albanian refugee convoy that killed 87. [3] Yugoslav reports of total civilian deaths ranged as high as 6,000, while Western estimates range from 500-1500. Even this number was artificially inflated, NATO said, by Milosevic’s use of “human shields” bussed in to potential targets and confined there to die. Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon estimated that up to half of all civilians killed in the NATO air campaign may have been deliberately placed around bombing targets. He said such incidents stand as evidence of the “depravity of Milosevic,” thus demonstrating the justness of the war that was having over 600 bombing runs a day pounding those targets anyway. [4]

Under siege, Milosevic hung on stubbornly with solid support from Russia under President Yeltsin. On April 7, Milosevic met with a Russian envoy who stated that Russia condemned NATO's “criminal aggression on Yugoslavia,” insisted it should stop immediately, and passed on the Russian people's “support for and solidarity with the people of Yugoslavia.” [5] The air war evidenced the growing rift between the US and Russia as NATO took up its offensive military role. They had signed a “Founding Act” for cooperation in 1997 – that is between Yugoslav wars. When this failed to have Moscow consulted or even informed before the second campaign, they quit the partnership program and again adopted an adversarial stance with NATO. [6]

On June 10 Milosevic agreed to withdraw from Kosovo and the bombardment ended, though Milosevic’s power survived the conflict. The bombs had failed to force him to surrender, and in many ways nationalism had increased under foreign aggression. And he was reportedly ready for a bold new venture. According to a December 1999 article from the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), the Yugoslav leader entertained dreams of “an axis stretching eastward,” allied with Lybia, Iraq, and North Korea – and possibly China and/or Russia - as a sort of Pariah’s club who felt abused by the West for having chosen a different path. Belgrade state media described this proposal as “a coalition of free states ranged against the New World Order.” [7]

In late 1999, IWPR noted, delegations from the governments of Iraq and North Korea visited Belgrade as China delivered $300 million of ‘humanitarian’ aid. As Serbian Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic pointed out, “Yugoslavia has many friends in the world.” [8] Serbian Information Minister Aleksandar Vucic and Vojislav Seselj, Deputy PM in the Federal Government, jointly emphasized the need for these friends to move closer together in the “struggle against American imperialism and hegemony.” [9] Baghdad and Belgrade were working towards a deal whereby outstanding Yugoslav loans to Saddam’s government could be repaid in oil, as well as early talk on a “medicines for oil” deal. [10] So not only was Milosevic still in power, the butchers of Baghdad and Belgrade were moving closer together, both despite American-led wars and continued sanctions, hoping to scrape together enough of their own resources to trade and create a small outcast economy. The West’s policy of starving nations out by excluding them from the global economy was set to backfire by pushing aside one too many and creating a viable fringe bloc, with the colossal, if faint, possibility of Chinese and Russian inclusion.

Milosevic looked forward to presidential elections in Moscow and Washington to set the tone for his next plans. In Russia, Milosevic was distrustful of “Washington’s man” Yeltsin, reportedly banking on Communist Gennady Zyuganov as next Russian president. IWPR reported that Milosevic felt Zyuganov could forge “a military-political alliance between Russia and China, which would of course include Yugoslavia.” And on the American front he was looking for the Clinton team that had so harassed him to simply go away. IWPR predicted that “a victory by the Republican and isolationist candidate George Bush Jr. in the US would likely lessen Washington's will to get involved overseas.” [11] As 2000 dawned, the US direction was yet to be seen but it was clear Putin was in power in Russia, and while not a communist he was keen on reviving Soviet policies and as time would show he had his own geopolitical ambitions, some indeed involving Milosevic’s hoped for alliance with China (a point to which we’ll return in later chapters). Washington clearly felt that the time to take out Milosevic was short – preferably before the US elections.

As Gene Sharp would later tell an interviewer, “when violence fails, people don't say violence doesn't work. They keep the belief that violence is the most powerful thing they can do even though it has proved to be a disaster.” [12] This was the perfect time and place to prove that attitude wrong. Serbia in 2000 provided the fertile soil of political discontent by the tractor-load. Political analyst Dejan Anastasejevic explained the source of this sullen mood:

“The people turned against [Milosevic] because he lost four wars in a row. He initially had a very large support but once he lost four wars, people started to look at you and thought may be you are not a very competent man. Also living standard in Serbia went sharply down during his rule because of the sanctions by the United Nations. People wanted these sanctions lifted so that they could live like normal people. And only way they saw that could happen was to remove Milosevic from power.” [13]

So even the discontent can be engineered from without as in this case - bombs and sanctions were direct decisions of the nations targeting Milosevic for removal. But either way the idea was planted in peoples’ minds – there is only one way out of this situation and Milosevic is blocking the exit. As Metta Spencer explained in Peace magazine, “Sharp has shown that dictators require the assistance of the people they rule - their skills and knowledge, their material resources, and especially their submission.” Once these were broken in Serbia, Spencer claims with only some hyperbole “Sharp's strategy brought down Milosevic.” [14]

Next: otpor! "Biting the system."

Sources:
[1] Justin Logan and Ted Galen Carpenter. “NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear.” Cato Institute. January 27 2006. Accessed via MosNews. http://www.mosnews.com/commentary/2006/01/27/russianbear.shtml
[2], [4] “NATO says 'human shields' account for bombing deaths Albanian troops clash with Serbs.” CNN. May 18 1999. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/17/kosovo.03/
[3] “Who NATO Killed.” Edited by Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair. Counterpunch. 1999. Accessed at: http://www.counterpunch.org/dead.html
[5] “Yugoslavia's Milosevic meets with Russia's Seleznyov.” April 7 1999. Accessed May 4, 2006 at:
http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-04/07/10606.html
[6] De Haas, Marcel. ''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities.'' Power and Interest News Report. May 29 2006. http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=498&language_id=1
[7], [8], [9], [10], [11] Sunter, Daniel. “Milosevic Dreams Of Military Axis To The East.” Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Dec 17 1999.
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=bcr&s=f&o=245700&apc_state=henibcr1999
[12] Spencer, metta. “Transcript: An Interview with Gene Sharp.” Peace Magazine. July 9, 2003. http://www.why-war.com/news/2003/07/09/aninterv1.html
[13] Htet, U Min. “Serbia: Demise of a Dictator.” BBC News. September 16 2005. http://www.bbc.co.uk/burmese/learning/story/2005/09/050912_transition_prog12.shtml
[14] Spencer, Metta. “Gene Sharp and Serbia: Introduction: Nonviolence versus a Dictatorship.” Peace Magazine Oct-Dec 2001, p.14. http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v17n4p14.htm

GENE SHARP, MASTER OF NONVIOLENT WARFARE

NATO had been signed into existence in Washington just four months before Moscow announced its first atomic detonation in August 1949 and ushered in the looming mutual nuclear terror that marked the Cold War. At that same time a young student at Ohio State University named Gene Sharp took note of the changed landscape. He later explained that he was deeply concerned with the threat of nuclear annihilation, the role of war, and the limits of peace when confronted with, for example, a Hitler or a Stalin. In 1951 Sharp graduated with a Masters degree in Sociology, and set on a path of continuing education, working on this tension between conflict and pacifism, seeking a workable middle road that neither rejected conflict nor embraced violence.

His particular focus at Ohio State had been on Gandhi’s non-violent movement in India, a scope that widened after Sharp moved to England to earn a doctorate in political theory from the esteemed Oxford University in 1968. By then he had already begun taking research appointments at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs, where he took a faculty position after Oxford, over the next three decades earning a reputation as Harvard’s “Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare.” [1]
At the heart of Sharp’s intellectual career is the organization of a system whereby civil resistance could be used, when negotiation and persuasion has finally been ruled out, to peacefully overthrow a government. At its brilliant core is the realization that in order to remain in power, a leader needs the support of people who remain loyal; a government’s power is to a large extent centered in the heads of its citizens (not to mention its politicians, business leaders, military personnel, etc.) Thus if those people can be brought to break the shackles of mental slavery and recognize that they are the source of the state's power, they can refuse their obedience and their leaders will be left helpless and vulnerable.

Sharp’s later catalog of writings is impressive: The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1973) is widely considered the definitive study of nonviolent struggle. Making Europe Unconquerable (1985) focused on a civilian-based defense for Western Europe, a theme further developed in the provocatively titled Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System (1990). In these books he argued that organized nonviolent defiance could deter or turn back even well armed occupiers or depose internal tyrants. The latter book was reportedly put to use in the early 1990s by the newly independent governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania “in planning their defense against Soviet efforts to regain control.” [2]

Dr. Gene Sharp, the “Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare,” in 2005

It’s worthy of note both the admission that these ideas represented a weapons system, and that as with other weapons systems, it is initially morally couched as purely defensive in nature. This is Pentagon-level stuff, and indeed Sharp is no granola-munching hippie pacifist. He does not spend much time critiquing the underlying aims of military conflict; his gripe is with the unnecessary violent effects – he sought not so much to stop wars as to achieve their goals by other means. In fact he has said that military thinkers understand him better than “peace people.” [3]

To further solidify his mission, Sharp founded the Albert Einstein Institution (AEI) in 1983, dedicated to “advancing the study and use of strategic nonviolent action in conflicts throughout the world.” [4] Einstein was chosen as the namesake because, as the AEI website explains, “at various times he was a war resister, a supporter of the war against the Nazi system, and an advocate of world government” and later saw “the potential of nonviolent struggle.” [5] Einstein was impressed enough that he provided a foreword for Sharp’s first book in 1960. [6] The book was called Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power, yet Sharp rejected the spiritual core of that moral power. In a 2005 interview he explained his research into Gandhi’s struggle was based “not [on] pacifism, not on any mahatma nonsense, but on pragmatic nonviolent struggle.” [7]

Sharp watched with approval the wave of revolutions across the former Soviet empire and its client states 1n 1989-91, and in 1993 he released an early version of his most widely-read book, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (abbreviated FDTD). The book was first published not in English, but in the four major Burmese dialects, printed by installment in newspapers in Thailand, and smuggled into neighboring Burma (Myanmar), where a long-running struggle of citizens against a repressive regime was underway. [8] The book was also put to use in existing US-sponsored tactical training of Burmese opposition forces, a case we’ll look at below.

So far the book’s suggestions have not been carried through to regime change there, but besides the four initial-run languages, FDTD has since been translated into more than twenty different languages, including Arabic, Belarusian, Chinese (traditional and simplified), Indonesian, Russian, Serbian, Spanish and Ukrainian and spread worldwide on well-funded winds. Through the 1990s and with strong support from a growing network of powerful individuals and organizations, the book served widely as a handbook for all the peoples of Eastern Europe, Central or East Asia and Latin America emerging from Communist oppression or hoping to emerge from any other oppression that was disfavored in Washington.

As Sharp notes, once a dictator’s “sources of power” have been located and the public mobilized, “then the population will be able, when needed, to restrict or sever the supply of those sources.” [9] He does not specify who would decide just when such a severing would be needed, but others have had plenty of good ideas. And once a dictator is deposed, even nonviolently, the question remains of who would then take the reins of power, which after all abhors a vacuum. When one leader replaces another, it’s sometimes called a “coup d’etat,” often an anti-democratic procedure with which the US government prefers not to be associated (not that that always stops them). Whatever his original intentions in this endeavor, Sharp wound up designing a template for what journalist Jonathan Mowat would later come to call “the postmodern coup d'etat,” one that sneaks in under cover of a people’s movement. [10]

A final irony - Sharp's initial talk of a "post-military weapons system" seems well-intentioned enough, a reflection of a hope that the we were moving towards a post-military world. But by the year 2000 his nonviolent template was set to remove a foreign head of state in Serbia, the heart of a disintegrating Yugoslavia which had just whethered two separate NATO bombing campaigns and tightening UN sanctions. Since Sharp's notions were finally used there to finish what the bombs had begun, the "post-military" descriptor takes on a less phiolosophical, more tactical quality. It's not about warfare in a weaponless world, it's about the warfare the commences post-militarily - when the actual bombing is done.

Next: Weaponizing Nonviolence: Col Helvey

Sources:
[1], [2], [6] "Gene Sharp: A Biographical Profile." Peace Magazine. http://www.peace.ca/genesharp.htm
[3] Transcript: An Interview with Gene Sharp. Conducted by Metta Spencer, Peace Magazine. July 9, 2003. http://www.why-war.com/news/2003/07/09/aninterv1.html
[4] Albert Einstein Institution – website – mission
[5] Albert Einstein Institution. “About our Name.” Accessed May 12 2006 at: http://www.aeinstein.org/organizationsf7bd.html
[7] Secor,Laura. "War by other means: Boston's Gene Sharp learned how to turn nonviolence into a weapon - and helped quite literally change the world." Boston Globe. May 29 2005. http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/05/29/war_by_other_means/
[8] Rozen, Laura. "Dictator downturn: It just isn't as easy being a tyrant as it used to be." Salon. February 3 2001. http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/02/03/dictators/print.html
[9] Book Review: "Waging Nonviolent Struggle:20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential." Gene Sharp, Porter Sargent Publishers, 2005, Boston, 598 pages. John Bacher (reviewer)http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v21n3p28.htm
[10] Mowat, Jonathan. “Coup d'État in Disguise: Washington's New World Order "Democratization" Template” Center for research on Globalization. February 9, 2005. http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/MOW502A.html