ZAYER AND HELVEY: NO TO SADDAM, NO TO WAR

Adam Larson
Caustic Logic/Guerillas Without Guns
Posted April 11 2007

Ultimately weaponized nonviolence failed to replace outright war in Iraq, but that doesn’t mean some people didn’t push to give peace a chance to bring down the Butcher of Baghdad. As the long-suffering citizens of Iraq turned out for the October 2002 Presidential “election,” it was clear that there was little chance of change by that route. Banners across the country urged Iraqis to vote “Yes, yes, yes for Saddam,” a message reinforced by both outright State power and by state radio repetition of Hussein’s campaign song – reportedly I Will Always Love You by Whitney Houston, another sign of his relentless cruelty. [1] As with previous elections, marked ballots were used so those who voted no, no, no against Saddam would be known, and thus the Iraqi dictator hoped to match the 99.96 percent affirmation he had previously claimed. Exiled opposition leader Ismail Zayer described the election as “a forced pledge of loyalty […] The whole practice is a fiasco, orchestrated by a regime that does not believe in the people's voice. […] Their real voices, if given the choice, will say no to Saddam loud and clear.” [2]

Iraqi dissident and No to Saddam founder Ismael Zayer in 2004

Zayer had already been saying it himself for a while, and working with other Iraqi exiles had formed his own organization actually called “No to Saddam.” The organization was patterned to some extent on Otpor and was committed to severing Saddam’s dictatorship with massive strikes and other nonviolent civil insurgent tactics. [3] He proposed that the world should neither tolerate Saddam’s Tyranny nor resort to carpet bombing – Zayer called his approach “The Third Choice.” [4] “We have already succeeded in establishing a small network within the country and are planning a clandestine media campaign,” promised Zayer, a journalist by trade. [5]

One demonstration he seems to have organized early on “really opened people's eyes.” Demonstrators in Baghdad shouted pro-Saddam chants as cover for taking over the streets, refusing to allow their patriotic display to be dispersed even by warning gunshots. Saddam was not looking for an excuse to crack down as the US war machine loomed, and so no one died. “Many thought such protests were not possible,” Zayer said, but they had been emboldened by the positive example. [6]

He had hoped initially to forge a millions-strong civil insurgency, and approached US decision-makers about helping him. While overall support remained muted and Zayer’s group received almost no media coverage even after the war, some influential people in the regime change industry did answer the call. John Bacher reported in Peace magazine that a seminar was held in 2001 to discuss the possibility of such a campaign. Hosted by Peter Ackerman’s Center for Nonviolent Conflict, Woolsey’s Freedom House, and the US Institute for Peace, this reported gathering occurred “almost a year after the successful nonviolent Serbian Revolution of 2000,” so right around the time of the September 11 attacks, one would presume before. Details like exact date, location, speakers and itinerary remain unclear, but it seems to have been in Western Europe.

This 2001 seminar was followed by a two-day workshop in Washington called “Prospects for Democratic Change in Iraq,” held at American University on May 24 and 25 2002. It was organized by the Iraq Institute For Democracy, based in “Iraqi Kurdistan” and sponsored by Freedom House. A tentative itinerary I located online listed the legendary Robert Helvey as set to speak right before lunch during session two, “Civilian-based Resistance and Regime Change in Iraq.” Jack DuVall and Peter Ackerman from the Center for Nonviolent Conflict were also to present in this session; collectively they were to address three topics: “1. The record of nonviolent conflict in bringing down a dictator 2. Developing a strategy for Iraqi civilian resistance 3. International assistance for civilian-based action in Iraq.” [7] At this session as in his earlier venture in Burma, Bacher explained, “Helvey's military experience helped persuade skeptical Iraqi exiles that nonviolence is a viable approach.” [8]

Helvey's strongest supporter at the May strategy session was reportedly Ismael Zayer, and for the next year Helvey proceeded to help him pursue the Third Choice, delivering preliminary training to 50 leaders of No to Saddam. [9] Presumably the group was considered a central element of any such planned upheaval, but “unfortunately,” Bacher reported, “[Zayer’s] effort was not assisted by other countries and only thousands of Iraqis took part - far short of the millions he had hoped for.” He diligently continued the crusade, asking European supporters to send monitors to future Iraqi elections. In a phone interview on the eve of the Iraq War’s commencement, Zayer pleaded that “to achieve the third choice, we need help. Not with armies or with money,” he explained from his home in the Netherlands. “We need help in the form of nonviolent training to protect ourselves from Saddam and his agents. We can do it, but we need help now.” [10]

Next: Washington’s answer: No to Zayer, Yes to Force Presence

Sources:
[1], [2] “In Iraqi vote today, choice is Hussein or ... Hussein.” St. Petersburg Times (Florida). Compiled from Times wires - published October 15, 2002. http://www.sptimes.com/2002/10/15/Worldandnation/In_Iraqi_vote_today__.shtml
[3], [4], [8], [9], [10] Bacher, John. “Robert Helvey's Expert Political Defiance”
Peace Magazine. Apr-Jun 2003, p.10. http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v19n2p10.htm
[5], [6], Bacher, John. “The Price for Peace: How a Cool $45 million could solve Saddam problem.” http://www.nowtoronto.com/issues/2002-12-05/news_story4.php
[7] Partial Schedule of event, found at: http://www.kurd.org/events/SinjariConf.html

COL. HELVEY: WEAPONIZING NOVIOLENCE

Adam Larson
Caustic Logic/Guerillas Without Guns
April 11 2007

The president of the Albert Einstein Institution as of 2006 is retired US Army Colonel Robert Helvey, a longtime proponent of Sharp’s theories. More than anyone else it has been Helvey who has weaponized his mentor’s ideas of nonviolent conflict and put it to use in the field. He holds a BA and MA from Marshall University, is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, and US Navy War College. [1] He has 30 years of experience in Southeast Asia, including two tours of duty in Vietnam (awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, January 1968). [2] Helvey has also worked with the U.S. Defense Intelligence College, which is in turn connected to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in which he was reportedly an officer. [3] Exact details of his life and career remain somewhat vague, but among other posts he held, from 1983 until 1985 Helvey was a US military attaché at the American Embassy in Rangoon, the capital of Burma. The Colonel later described how he became dismayed by the utter futility of the two-decade-old US-backed armed struggle against the military dictatorship there. [4]

Col. Robert Helvey, leading strategist of nonviolent struggle.

He spent his last years of military service mulling over this dilemma, the final year in an academic setting. Curiously, he wound up with a senior fellowship at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, where he happened to hear about a lecture on nonviolent sanctions to be given by the department’s esteemed professor Gene Sharp. Helvey later recalled how Sharp “started out the seminar by saying 'Strategic nonviolent struggle is all about political power,” spurring Helvey to muse “Boy is this guy speaking my language, that is what armed struggle is about.” [5] An article from Peace magazine, April 2003 explained:

“From conversations with Sharp and like-minded colleagues at the Albert Einstein Institution, Helvey learned a systematic strategy of resistance. For example, he learned to avoid exposed situations that could lead to heavy casualties such as the protest in 1988 when 3,000 unarmed students were massacred in Rangoon. He came to see that even greater pressure could be applied to the regime with less risky tactics, such as having people simply stay at home during a general strike.” [6]

After officially retiring from the Army in 1991, Helvey took Sharp’s ideas to a wider audience of influential people. He soon secured funding to go back to Burma to spread his message and, if possible, test the technique. From 1992-98 Helvey made over a dozen trips to the Thai-Burmese border to meet with leaders of pro-democracy groups there. He developed and taught a six-week course, with students cycling through in shifts to work on confidence building, identifying the regime's weaknesses, and forming “usable pressure groups.” When confronted by Burmese leaders who scoffed at non-violence against the thugs in charge, Helvey started using the more militant-sounding phrase “political defiance,” which, he stressed, “like military struggle, is both an art and a science. To be effective, it must be studied and carried out with skill and discipline.” [7]

The training Helvey brought to Burma is still used, in line as it is with the non-violent tactics stressed by “the Lady,” Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Modern Burma’s founding father. Helvey describes Suu Kyi, under house arrest for years, as “the symbol of the entire pro-democracy movement. Without her, the movement has not demonstrated the ability to take on strategic struggle.” It was reportedly at Suu Kyi’s urging that Sharp's book FDTD was translated, published, and smuggled into Burma. [8] So far the repressive regime is still in power, but Suu Kyi maintains a strong following and has gradually been given more freedom, and thankfully there have been no more massacres like the one in 1988. But direct success or not, Helvey adopted and championed Sharp’s approach to winning conflicts, retired and became a man of peace heading the AEI as it embarked on its many adventures. Over the following years and the course of this book, Helvey would fulfill an important niche in the real-world implementation of Sharp’s ideas in over a half-dozen countries. Some of his handiwork will play a role in the following chapters.

Next: The American End: Overt Ops/A Bi-Partisan Effort

Sources:
[1] About AEI > Staff & Board > Bob Helvey, President. Accessed at: http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations.php3?action=printContentItem&orgid=88&typeID=7&itemID=48&User_Session=346723d93fdd7b3f54352c8c92b94d2f
[2] First Cavalry Division Distiguished Service cross Recipients. Acc. June 12 2006 at: http://www.1stcavmedic.com/DSC-CAV.htm
[3] Mowat, Jonathan. “Coup d'État in Disguise: Washington's New World Order "Democratization" Template.”
GlobalResearch.ca February 9, 2005. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=MOW20050209&articleId=437
[4], [6], [7] Bacher, John. "Robert Helvey's Expert Political Defiance." Peace Magazine Apr-Jun 2003, p.10. http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v19n2p10.htm
[5] Mowat, Jonathan. "The new Gladio in action? Ukrainian postmodern coup completes testing of new template." Online Journal. March 19 2005. http://www.onlinejournal.org/Special_Reports/031905Mowat-1/031905mowat-1.html
[8] Rozen, Laura. "Dictator downturn: It just isn't as easy being a tyrant as it used to be." Salon. February 3 2001.
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/02/03/dictators/print.html

ZIMBABWE/IRAQ 2003

THE LIMITS OF NON-VIOLENCE
ADAM LARSON
CAUSTIC LOGIC / GUERILLAS WITHOUT GUNS
Posted 2/27/07

American support like that offered in Serbia was not universally supported – there were exceptions. In Africa, for example, Zimbabwe was in its own turmoil at the same time; strongman Robert Mugabe had spawned his own opposition, the leaders of which were inspired by other revolutionary struggles around the world. They immediately acted after seeing the dramatic success of Otpor in Belgrade. Laura Rozen wrtote for Salon in February 2001:

“Hours after Milosevic fell in October, anti-government protests swept through Zimbabwe as parliamentary elections approached. Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai vowed to stop ‘Africa's Milosevic.’ “Mugabe has committed genocide against a minority, rigged elections, ignored the rule of law, and created a state which is internationally isolated," Tsvangirai said Oct. 6, just as Milosevic was conceding defeat in Belgrade. “We have given Mugabe a warning. A similar situation to Yugoslavia cannot be avoided.” [1]

But of course such a thing could be avoided and was. Nothing like the Bulldozer Revolution happened in Zimbabwe at that time. There are opposition leaders on the scene, Tsvangirai foremost among them, and by early 2005 he was finally receiving help from Colonel Helvey and others, according to the Christian Science Monitor. [2] But the public has not rallied behind the opposition to a large enough degree and as of mid-2006 Mugabe is still in power.

This citizen “apathy” has been blamed on many factors, but two that Helvey pointed out as key obstacles were hunger and AIDS. “When people are starving, it's awfully hard to promote democracy,” he explained. Roughly 40% of the nation’s 12 million people are near starvation, according to a recent report. In such circumstances, “you can't have 1 million people sitting in the streets of the capital for 17 days,” Helvey elaborated. “There's not going to be food for them.” Then there's AIDS. In 2002, the official HIV infection rate was 27 percent, one of the world's highest and thought to have gone up since then. Helvey wondered in such a climate, “who's got the energy to protest?” [3] Thus it seems Helvey’s tactic falls flat in places like Zimbabwe, where reforms are most urgently needed.

But perhaps the apathy regarding reform there lies elsewhere. It could be that Zimbabwe simply offered too few riches to be seen as worthwhile in Washington. This possibility indicates one key moral weakness of the strategy – while promising to remove a reviled dictator without resort to violent war, like war it tends to work only where the US is looking to invest; no type of conflict is waged if a target nation hasn’t enough to offer.

However, and for other reasons, Sharp’s nonviolent conflict also got no real support against Saddam Hussein in Iraq which clearly does have massive resources – primarily one of the world’s largest supplies of petroleum in an age of shrinking supplies. The U.S. was already in a state of war against a reviled dictator there; after the fierce bombardment of its infrastructure in 1991, Iraq continued to marinade in economic sanctions through the Clinton years, punctuated with occasional air strikes whenever Saddam was perceived as trying to sneak out of his “box.” No fly zones enforced by the U.S. ostensibly to protect Kurds in the North and Shiites in the South left most of Iraq beyond Baghdad’s effective control. Iraq was thus progressively weakened; even as Saddam himself retained his elaborate network of grandiose palaces, the nation’s people were wracked with malnutrition, water-borne disease, and epidemic deformities possibly caused by US-deposited Depleted Uranium munitions. On top of this the sanctions and inadequate oil-for-food program held fast. Madeleine Albright even told 60 Minutes in 1996 (she was UN Ambassador at the time, soon-to-be Secretary of State) that the reported 500,000 children who had died from the sanctions were “worth it,” although it was a “hard” calculation. (She later explained that she regretted making this admission and should instead have deflected the question by blaming the peoples’ suffering on Saddam, as was standard.) [4]

The sanctions regime thus dragged on into the twilight of the Clinton years as the Serbian situation unfolded. But one way or another it was set to change. It was the re-emerging superpower rival Russia that started leading the charge to end sanctions and bring Iraq, even with Saddam Hussein in charge, back into the mainstream oil economy. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov explained to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in mid-2000 that the Russian government was “in favor of mitigating the limitations imposed on Russia by the sanctions.” This position was supported by French president Jaques Chirac, who further called the sanctions “dangerous, inhumane, and inappropriate.” [5] The London Financial Times reported on September 12 2000 “the Russian and French positions are giving Iraq hope that the sanctions, if not lifted, will soon become meaningless.” Deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz explained in an interview with the magazine “Iraq's practically becoming more like Cuba vis a vis the US. […] Everyone else is trading with Cuba, this is going to be the future of the matter.” [6]

A different course to ending sanctions was coalescing in the US, crafted by neoconservative Republican power hopefuls as part of a plan to preserve “the global Pax Americana.” The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the by-now infamous think tank featuring names like Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Perle and Woolsey, had formed in 1997 to promote a strong, bold, well-funded military and unapologetic globe-molding neo-imperialism informed by “American values” and “American interests.” The PNAC’s guiding document for making the 21st century a New American one was its September 2000 report Rebuilding America’s Defenses. The report took a belligerent tone towards Iraq, outlined along with Iran and North Korea (soon Bush’s “axis of evil”) as the three biggest troublemakers in the global system. Russia and China were listed as competitors to contain. Tensions with Russia, China and France would lead to deadlock in the UN Security Council, specifically over Iraq, so the report focused on willingness to take unilateral action or rely on ad-hoc coalitions.

The described high-tech high-cost military “process of transformation,” and its geopolitical aims including in Iraq, would be difficult to achieve, the report noted, without the realization of “a catastrophic and catalyzing event, like a new Pearl harbor.” This report was released and utterly ignored in September 2000, a year before that precise event was delivered and just months before a large PNAC contingent took the reins of power along with George W Bush in the deeply troubling 2000 Election. Among the signatories of that report were Paul Wolfowitz, who would be Deputy Defense Secretary, no. 2 to fellow PNACer Rumsfeld, and Scooter Libby, who would be Chief of Staff to fellow PNACer Cheney; that is, the top aides the top PNACER’s at both the Pentagon and White House.

The dust had just settled in Serbia after the bulldozer revolution when Bush was sworn-in. For the next eight months, as widely noted, Bush’s foreign policy just sort of drifted about amid growing domestic problems – to much of the world this seemed a lull, as if they were waiting for something to show them the way. After the September 11 attacks and the announcement of a worldwide “War on Terror,” Rebuilding America’s Defenses was for all intents and purposes adopted by the administration as the master strategy for the new generational struggle. Defense secretary Rumsfeld and his team got their direction, coordinating with Cheney at the White House, and began pushing events towards Iraq. Bush delivered a speech at the wounded Pentagon on October 11, 2001, announcing his firm dedication to the PNAC vision, and that 9/11 was indeed the fulfillment of their “new Pearl Harbor” prophecy. In response to the report’s call for increased Pentagon budgets, Bush assured them “in the missions ahead for the military, you will have everything you need, every resource, every weapon, every means to assure full victory for the United States and the cause of freedom.” [7]

But when it came to Iraq, this did not include the Sharp-Helvey nonviolent “post-military weapons system” so recently proven in Serbia. The PNAC had in 1999 targeted Milosevic for downfall and urged Clinton and Congress to take the actions they finally did. [8] One would think they’d be aware of and pleased with Colonel Helvey’s work with Otpor, which had finished the job. Likewise, the PNAC had their sights set on Saddam Hussein, but of course, there was no such utopian revolution in Baghdad, only war and occupation.

The PNAC’s 2000 report said the US had long wanted a “more permanent role in Gulf regional security,” backed up by a “substantial American force presence” in the region, a need which they emphasized “transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.” [9] Such a military presence was then extant but threatened in Saudi Arabia; in August 2001 Crown Prince Abdullah in fact quietly and informally requested US forces to leave so he could avoid “the fate of the Shah of Iran.” [10] To get a new force presence, an internal revolution was not what was needed. It was not Otpor and their revolution that left NATO troops in Yugoslavia after all, but the earlier military conflict. And after more than a decade of brutal sanctions and bombs, it was unlikely that any internally produced new regime in Iraq would invite American basing there if given the choice. So the force presence would have to be hammered in, which seems to have been the plan from step one.

Next: Zayer and Helvey: No to Saddam, No to War

Sources:
[1] Rozen, Laura. “Dictator downturn: It just isn't as easy being a tyrant as it used to be.” Salon. February 3 2001 http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/02/03/dictators/print.html
[2], [3] McLaughlin, Abraham. “In Zimbabwe, people power fails to ignite.” Christian Science Monitor
from the March 22, 2005 edition Accessed June 12, 2006.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0322/p01s04-woaf.html
[4] Richman, Sheldon. “Albright Aplogizes.” The Future of Freedom Foundation. November 7 2003. http://www.fff.org/comment/com0311c.asp
[5], [6] Hoyos, Carola. “Russia in New Push to Lift Iraq Sanctions.” Finanacial Times. September 12 2000.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/council/russ0009.htm
[7] President George W. Bush's Pentagon Memorial Speech. October 11, 2001 Copied October 19, 2004 from: http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBushPentagon.htm
[8] “Mr. President, Milosevic is the Problem.” Project for a New American Century, International Crisis Group, Balkan Action Council, and Coalition for International Justice. Open letter to the President of the United States. September 20, 1998.
[9] Project for a New American Century Rebuilding America’s Defenses September 2000 Page 14.
[10] Pipes, Daniel “The Scandal of U.S.-Saudi Relations.” The National Interest. Winter 2002/03 http://www.danielpipes.org/article/995

ZUBR IN BELARUS

OUTPOST OF TYRANNY / JEANS ON THE 16th
Adam Larson
Caustic Logic / Guerillas Without Guns
2/20/07

The seeds of an Orange-style revolution in landlocked Belarus had been planted earlier, less than a year after Otpor’s success in Belgrade when, in August 2001, US ambassador Michael Kozak helped organize a near identical campaign in Minsk. [1] Robert Helvey has also left his footprint there, according to his AEI bio, probably for this early venture but possibly at some later time. But with a weak opposition ticket and Luka maintaining moderate public loyalty, the 2001 movement failed to catch on and the election that year rolled on to an inevitable Lukashenko victory. “There will be no Kostunica in Belarus,” the president declared in reference to the recent events in Serbia. [2] For the time being that was true and Lukashenko remained in power, but over the next years as Georgia and Ukraine fell with their own new leaders installed, the danger became real again as the 2006 presidential elections began to draw near.

There was a list of possible Belarusian Kostunicas – more than one could simply make disappear. There was Mikhail Marinich, an opposition politician jailed in December 2004 for allegedly stealing office equipment, charges he insisted were politically motivated, and was denied early release in September 2005. [3] There was Alexander Kazulin, leader of Social Democratic Party, who tried to crash a conference being addressed by Lukashenko in early 2006, arrested and allegedly beaten by police. [4] Most prominent among them was Alexander Milinkievic, the candidate put forth by the United Democratic Forces of Belarus (UDFB) coalition; Milinkevich would prove a key leader of the turmoil to come but has somehow escaped much jail time.

The distinctive and bold Zubr logo

Belarusian youth opposition leaders had been meeting with Otpor veterans since 2001, when Ian Traynor reported that ambassador Kozak “organised the dispatch of young opposition leaders to the Baltic, where they met up with Serbs traveling from Belgrade.” [5] After these meetings, presumably in neighboring Lithuania, a youth group had emerged for that year’s failed revolution. This time their simple, catchy name was “Zubr,” Belarusian for Bison. As in America, the bison is a national treasure and a symbol of resolute strength, of which a Belarusian nature preserve hosts the last big herds. Metta Spencer noted in Peace “it is clear that Zubr was developed, or at least conceptualized, using Otpor as a model.” [6] The group also offers Sharp’s FDTD (in English) from their website, which it stresses is dedicated to “Honor! Motherland! Freedom!”

Zubr activists strike a telling pose at their 2003 hockey action

The early-rising movement was well established and active for a second time even before their Georgian counterparts in Kmara really got going. In a move reminiscent of an Otpor anti-Milosevic campaign, thousands of posters with slogan “He must go!” were glued in the center of Minsk in late January 2003. Two members were arrested for their part in this campaign. [7] To break the fear they used innovative street theater like the February 2003 hockey match that pitted a team of local Zubr kids against “Luka’s” team, headed by a captain in a mustachioed goalkeeper’s mask. The Zubr website reported the “team of young patriots was very rallied. In dictator’s team just the opposite - every player played his own game. [The captain] was shouting at his teammates, and beating them with his stick. He was trying to show the way they must play but he was falling every time.” [8]

Their protest activities seem to have sloughed off after this; Lukashenko imposed government control over all foreign funding meant for local NGOs and banned foreign funding of any political activities in the country. [9] Ambassador Kozak was rotated out to calm tensions, and replaced in September 2003 with new hand George A. Krol. Things remained fairly quiet for Zubr until the flames were fanned by Washington; Following passage of the Belarus Democracy Act in 2004 and as the 2006 election drew near, the rhetoric heightened and the noose tightened. Lukashenko’s regime was listed by Secretary of State Rice, in her confirmation hearing, as one of six “outposts of tyranny,” alongside North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Burma, and Zimbabwe. [10] The phrase took. “I am ashamed America has labeled us an outpost of tyranny,” a Belarusian citizen told a BBC reporter during an opposition rally. “I'm here to try and change that.” [11]

April 2005 saw Secretary Rice visiting first Moscow and then Vilnius, capital of rebellious former SSR Lithuania and just a few miles from the Belarus border. On the 20th, at an informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers, Rice said it was “time for a change” in that “outpost of Tyranny” next door. The comment prompted a reply from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in town to represent Russia and discuss its links with NATO. Lavrov said Russia “would not advocate what some people call regime change anywhere. You cannot impose democracy from the outside.” [12]

Nonetheless, a group of seven Zubr affiliates tried to cross the border into Lithuania to meet that “outside” the night of Rice’s speech. They claim they were harassed, but ultimately released, by Belarusian authorities. This delayed their arrival by more than two hours, a Bush official complained. Rice greeted the dissidents at a hotel the next day, April 21, reassuring them “while it may be difficult and long and at times even far away, there will be a road to democracy in Belarus. We admire your courage, and we admire your dedication and we want you all to know you are in our thoughts.” After the meeting, the youths told the media that they planned to organize a re-run of Ukraine, beginning that very autumn. Rice, at her own news conference, said the US is not calling the shots or interfering in any way other than moral. Referring to the kids she’d just met, she said “these are the people who know what's best to do.” [13]

Indeed they did and were on the case within days. Early May witnessed about 100 Zubr kids demonstrating for half an hour on a main street in Minsk, holding pictures of Viktor Gonchar and then dispersing quickly before police could arrest them. [14] During the election campaign Zubr officially linked up with and leant support to opposition leader Milinkievic of the UDFB, and over the next months the politicians and their street ambassadors gradually picked up steam.

And they picked up cash contributions, down payments on and investments in the possible revolution. Jauhen Afnagel, the nominal leader of Zubr, says their funds come “from our friends, in Belarus and outside Belarus.” The “inside” of Belarus, with its state-controlled economy, has none of the disgruntled, super-rich, private-sector businessmen like those that funded Ukraine’s revolution, so much more aid should be expected to come from abroad. Zubr and other like-minded groups have drawn funds from, at least, the Swedish Social Democrat party, Poland-based East European Democratic Centre (IDEE), and Washington’s NED. [15] A U.S. Embassy spokesperson in Minsk admitted vaguely “the U.S. government supports a broad range of youth groups and believes that the development of democratic values among youth is a priority of U.S. government assistance.” A leader of Malady Front, an opposition youth movement in support of Zubr and its goals, said “through Ukraine, we have big plans for cooperation with the Soros Foundation, which […] has helped bring together many youth organizations, covering the whole of Belarus.” [16]

By September - six months before Luka’s 2006 presidential referendum – they had something like a revolutionary critical mass as the economy soured and new corruption scandals were broadcast by the US-funded opposition media. September 7 saw a protest at the Polish Embassy in Minsk where Pro-Russian Slavic unity protests (‘neighbors should be friends’) stood against the Polish-supported opposition kids of Zubr and Malady Front, declaring “Poland + Belarus = Solidarity.” [17] Like Solidarity or any such transformative movement, it needed a unifying symbol or theme, the color in the revolution. Lukashenko proclaimed “in our country, there will be no pink or orange, nor even a banana revolution.” Zubr's Afnagel saw defensiveness in this statement: “he keeps saying that there will be no revolution in Belarus – why would he say that if revolution is not an option?” Rumors circulated that the mutiny would be called the Cornflower Revolution, named for a ubiquitous blue flower in Belarus. “It is too early to say what color the revolution will have,” Afnagel said in early September. “The color is not important. It is not even important whether it will be a revolution or some kind of a change.” [18]

The final inspiration this time came from a September 16 public demonstration marking the 6-year anniversary of the disappearance of Viktor Gonchar. After Belarusian police seized the banned red and white old Belarusian flags flown by the opposition, Zubr activist Mikita Sasim reportedly raised his denim shirt, declaring it their new flag. Conveniently, there is also the well-known association of denim with Western culture, immediately recognized by the opposition as a symbol of protest against Lukashenko's Soviet-style policies and identification with USA, Elvis, and NATO. After this an unofficial custom emerged for Zubrs to wear jeans or jean jackets on the 16th of each month to memorialize Gonchar and the missing others, and thus the “Jeans Revolution,” or “Denim Revolution” was named.

In December, the parliament approved tough new penalties for those who would try to change the government or even pass out information regarded as “harmful to national interests.” In the early months of 2006, dozens of Zubrs were arrested at their many demonstrations and actions. There were reports of harassment of “Zubrs” going about their other activities; some were jailed for minor offenses, or imprisoned for drugs planted on them by security officers. More replaced them, and while it was no Kiev, they were determined to claim victory either by the ballot or, failing that, by the Jeans Revolution.

Sources: